Reasoning about what other people see, know, and want is essential for navigating social life. Yet, even neurodevelopmentally healthy adults make perspective-taking errors. Here, we examined how the group membership of perspective-taking targets (ingroup vs. outgroup) affects processes underlying visual perspective-taking. In three experiments using two bases of group identity (university affiliation and minimal groups), interference from one's own differing perspective (i.e., egocentric intrusion) was stronger when responding from an ingroup versus an outgroup member's perspective. Spontaneous perspective calculation, as indexed by interference from another's visual perspective when reporting one's own (i.e., altercentric intrusion), did not differ across target group membership in any of our experiments. Process-dissociation analyses, which aim to isolate automatic processes underlying altercentricintrusion effects, further revealed negligible effects of target group membership on perspective calculation. Meta-analytically, however, there was suggestive evidence that shared group membership facilitates responding from others' perspectives when self and other perspectives are aligned.
Introduction
The demands of social life require that people actively reason about what other agents see, know, and want. Without direct access to other people's minds, however, inferring their contents is challenging: Even neurodevelopmentally healthy adults sometimes stumble in such endeavors (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 2003) . Recent research has identified various perceiver-based factors, including experiences of high power (Blader, Shirako, & Chen, 2016; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006) , cognitive load (Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010; Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012) , and anxious uncertainty (Todd, Forstmann, Burgmer, Brooks, & Galinsky, 2015; Todd & Simpson, 2016) , that can magnify these perspective-taking difficulties. Comparatively less is known about how target-based factors affect perspective-taking. Contrary to conventional wisdom -and some prior work (e.g., Adams et al., 2010) -suggesting that similarity between oneself and a perspective-taking target should ease mental-state inference, Todd, Hanko, Galinsky, and Mussweiler (2011) found that adults made more errors on a false-belief task (Birch & Bloom, 2007) when the protagonist was an ethnic ingroup member than when the protagonist was an ethnic outgroup member. Our aim here was to extend this prior work by shedding light on the mechanisms that shape perspective-taking in intergroup contexts.
Processes underlying perspective-taking
A major undertaking of much theoretical and empirical work on 'theory of mind' has been to explicate the cognitive processes involved in mental-state reasoning (see Apperly, 2010, for a review). On one noteworthy theoretical account, the ascription of mental states to oneself and others involves several distinct processes: an implicit calculation of possible mental contents (e.g., what another agent sees, knows, or wants) and an explicit selection of the most plausible among these potential contents while inhibiting competitors (Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005 ; for related accounts, see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Qureshi et al., 2010; Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly, & Samson, 2013) . Many of the most widely used mental-state reasoning tasks, including the false-belief task used by Todd et al. (2011) , assess the calculation and selection of another person's perspective while inhibiting one's own perspective, thereby conflating these different http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.003 0010-0277/Ó 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
